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In this paper, we investigate the impact of aggregate and idiosyncratic economic shocks 
on health using data on self-reported health status and mortality from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics. First, we document a large correlation between poor macroeconomic 
conditions and mortality for working-aged men. This correlation is robust to controls for 
baseline health which mitigates concerns that the correlation is the result of selection. 
There is no relationship between macroeconomic conditions and mortality for women. 
Next, to better understand how much of this correlation is the result of a causal impact of 
income shocks on health, we use methods from the literature on dynamic panel data 
models. Doing this, we find evidence of a causal impact of income shocks on health for 
working-aged men at the lowest parts of the income distribution. Finally, our analysis 
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1 Introduction
The relationship between economic circumstances and health or the gradient has been the subject
of academic inquiry for quite some time. While these inquiries have documented a strong positive
correlation between socioeconomic status (SES) and health in a variety of contexts, they have
failed to produce a consensus among scholars concerning the underlying causal pathways. Indeed,
ﬁerce debate has characterized the discussions among social scientists concerning the possible
directions of causality with the dividing lines often being drawn between disciplines. Typically,
on one side of the divide are the economists, who tend to champion the causal pathway from
health to income (Smith 1999, Adams, Hurd, et al. 2002). On the other side of the divide are
the public health experts and epidemiologists who tend to be advocates of the reverse causal
pathway from SES to health (Marmot, et al. 1991, Marmot 2004). In this paper, we attempt
to shed a new light on this debate by tackling the question of what happens to a person’s health
when their economic circumstances deteriorate.
To do this, we use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) which oﬀers a
wealth of information which can be exploited to investigate this issue. To measure economic
circumstance, we use data on income, labor supply and county-level unemployment rates. Our
health data are provided by measures of self-reported health status (SRHS) and the PSID’s death
2ﬁle which provides a record of the deaths of all PSID respondents through 2003.
One primary advantage of the PSID is that its longitudinal structure allows us to use a rich
literature on the estimation of dynamic panel data models. The estimation technique that we
use from this literature comes from Arellano and Bond (1991). It exploits moment conditions
which allow health to impact labor supply in contemporaneous and future time periods. If
valid, these conditions enable us to identify the causal impact of income shocks on health. One
of the advantages of the PSID is that its length guarantees a rich set of moments which allow
us to carry out speciﬁcation tests that shed light on the validity of these restrictions which are
imposed on the data. In addition, the procedure allows for individual-speciﬁc ﬁxed-eﬀects which
can be arbitrarily correlated with the right-hand-side covariates which mitigates many concerns
of omitted variables bias. While this and similar techniques have commonly been employed
in labor economics (see Carrasco 2001, Hyslop 1999, Meghir and Pistaferri 2004, for just a few
examples), these techniques are utilized with far less frequency in health economics.
The ﬁrst main ﬁnding of this paper is that we document a large correlation between poor
macroeconomic conditions and high mortality among working-aged men. This ﬁnding is robust
to a set of controls for baseline morbidity which, at least partially, mitigates concerns that the
ﬁnding is the consequence of selection or economically depressed areas tending to be composed of
unhealthy people rather than the direct causal impact of recessions on health. While there is a
similar correlation among older men, it is substantially less pronounced. In addition, aggregate
economic conditions in a given survey year tend to be highly correlated with mortality within
o n ey e a r ,b u tn o tw i t h i nt h r e eo rﬁve years of the survey year. Thus, if recessions have any
causal impact on mortality, these eﬀects occur rather quickly. Finally, we ﬁnd no relationship
3between recessions and mortality for women.
Our next main ﬁnding is that we provide some evidence of a causal impact of income shocks on
the morbidity of working-aged men using the Arellano Bond estimator. Our estimated coeﬃcient
on income is large and is equal and opposite the coeﬃcient on age. This suggests that part of
the correlation between recessions and poor health for working-aged men is the consequence of
an underlying causal relationship. These eﬀe c t st e n dt ob ec o n c e n t r a t e di nt h eb o t t o mp a r t
of the income distribution. However, it is important to mention that it is not clear how much
of the estimated impact of an income shock on morbidity actually translates into an impact on
mortality. Finally, once again, we do not ﬁnd any relationship between income and health for
women.
In addition to shedding some light on the gradient, these results also contribute to a vast
and related literature on the association between and recessions and health. Initially, the
conventional wisdom on this topic was that health deteriorated during economic downturns.
Indeed, inﬂuential studies by Brenner (1971, 1975 and 1979) have shown that infant mortality
and adult mortality from cardiovascular disease, cirrhosis, suicide and homicide exhibit strong
counter-cyclical variation. However, these studies have been criticized by many (e.g. Kasl 1979;
Wagstaﬀ 1985; Cook and Zarkin 1986), particularly, on the grounds that they are tainted by
omitted variables bias. Many studies (e.g. Forbes and McGregor 1984; McAvinchey 1986; Joyce
and Mocan 1993) that address these criticisms cannot replicate Brenner’s ﬁndings.
More recently, Ruhm (2000) has used panel data from US states and ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation
to address this omitted variables bias.1 Doing this, he shows that mortality rates from cardio-
1Similar ﬁndings have been uncovered in Spanish provinces (Tapia-Granados 2002) and in OECD Countries
(Gerdtham and Ruhm 2002).
4vascular disease, inﬂuenza/pneumonia and liver ailments are actually procyclical. Interestingly,
Ruhm (2000 and 2005) also provides evidence that many risk factors for mortality from these
causes also decrease in recessions. Using micro-data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Survey,
he shows that diets become less healthy and that drinking, smoking and physical inactivity all
increase when the economy improves.
However, there is a potential problem with Ruhm’s results due to the fact that mortality
rates in a state are typically measured with error which almost certainly will be correlated with
the macroeconomic conditions which prevail in that state. The reason for this is that recessions
tend to be accompanied by large out-migrations of people (Blanchard and Katz 1992). In the
presence of migration out of a state, mortality rates are very diﬃcult to compute because out-
migration will decrease the number of deaths that occur in that state for purely mechanical
reasons.2 Although this increase in deaths may be small in absolute terms, it is apt to be large
in percentage terms due to the infrequency with which death occurs. The net result is then a
spurious correlation between poor macroeconomic conditions and low mortality. Our failure to
uncover any evidence that health improves during an economic downturn using individual level
panel data (which is unaﬀected by these issues) suggests that Ruhm’s results may be driven by
the impact of migration on the measurement of the mortality rate as opposed to the impact of
recessions on the true mortality rate.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some theoretical
considerations. In Section 3, we discuss the data. In Section 4, we investigate the relationship
between aggregate economic shocks and health. In Section 5, we discuss the relationship between
2 For more on this issue, see Abraído-Lanza, et al (1999) and Palloni and Arias (2003).
5idiosyncratic economic shocks and health. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
In this section, we discuss the avenues through which recessions may impact a person’s health
within the context of a simple model of health investment al aGrossman (1972).3 We start out
by assuming that a person’s health is given by some stock variable which we call Ht. Individuals
have agency over their health in the sense that they can improve their health by investing it
units of their time in its production.4 We let wt denote the time t wage and let θ(wt)it be
the health production function. We allow the parameter θ(wt), which determines the marginal
productivity of health investment, to depend on wages. We assume that θ
0 ≥ 0 so that higher
wages either improve health or at the minimum have no impact on health. Finally, we assume
that health evolves according to
Ht+1 = θ(wt)it +( 1− δt)Ht. (1)
where δt t h er a t eo fd e p r e c i a t i o n .
Consumers maximize an inter-temporal utility function which depends on their health and
their consumption of a commodity which we call ct subject to their lifetime resource constraint.
We let u(ct,H t) be their sub-utility function and we assume that uc > 0,u H > 0,u cc < 0 and
3The framework in this section is simple in that it abstracts from numerous factors which may inﬂuence
health, many of which can be found in Grossman’s original work and the literature which Grossman’s work
inspired. However, our aim in this section is not to add to the literature on the theory of health investment.
Rather, it is to illustrate why one would expect economic shocks to have an ambiguous impact on health.
4One of the many contrasts between our simple formulation and Grossman’s original formulation is that we
only have one time input in the health production function.







where T is the length of life, which is endogenous in Grossman’s framework, but exogenous
in ours. We let lt denote the consumer’s labor supply at time t.I n a n y t i m e p e r i o d , t h e
consumer has ﬁnite time and, thus, the consumer’s labor supply and health investment decisions
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where A0 is the consumer’s initial asset level.
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An almost identical manipulation can be found in Case and Deaton (2004). This form of the
lifetime budget constraint shows how the consumer’s lifetime resources are spent on the elements
of the utility function: consumption and health. An interesting feature of equation (4) is that
it delivers the user cost of health which is
wt
θ(wt)
(r + δt). As pointed out by Case and Deaton
(2004), the user cost of health tells us the rate at which health can be converted into cash in
7order to pay for consumption. Using this form of the budget constraint, it is trivial to show











This condition is an intra-temporal relation which governs the optimal division of time between
work and health investment by equating the consumers willingness to substitute consumption
for health with ψt or the user cost of health.5
The impact of a decline in the wage on health will largely depend on its impact on the user











The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is positive so that higher wages will discourage health
investment by increasing its time cost. The second term tells us that, provided that θ
0 > 0
(which we concede is a controversial assumption in the economics profession), higher wages will
increase the demand for health by improving the marginal productivity of health investment.6,7
5The other optimality condition is uc(ct,H t)=( 1+r)βuc(ct+1,H t+1) which is the standard inter-temporal
Euler equation in which the marginal utility of consumption today is equated to the discounted marginal utility
of consumption tomorrow.
6The interpretation of δt +r is straight foward in equation (5). A high rate of depreciation implies that
the net returns to health investment are low which discourages health investment. Higher interest rates imply
that consumption tomorrow relative to today is cheap. This creates incentives to work more today and save for
tomorrow which entails less health investment today.
7Had we also considered the possibility of endogenous death, higher wages would also increase the returns to
a longer life and, thus, create an additional incentive for the consumer to invest in their health. Thus, with
endogenous mortality, we would have a third channel through which wages would impact the demand for health.
The relative magnitude of this eﬀect would depend crucially on the consumers discount factor with the eﬀect
being less important for more myopic consumers.
8Clearly, the net impact of a decline in the wage will depend on the relative magnitudes of both
of these eﬀects.8 The question of which eﬀect dominates is an empirical matter and the subject
of the remainder of the paper.
3D a t a
T h ed a t at h a tw ee m p l o yc o m ef r o mt h eP S I D . O u rs a m p l ei n c l u d e sv a r i a b l e so na g e ,r a c e ,
education, self-reported health status (SRHS), the unemployment rate in the respondent’s county
of residence, labor income and mortality. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for all of the
variables in our sample except for the mortality data. Note that because we include the Survey
of Economic Opportunities in our sample, which we discuss in more detail later, these summary
statistics may not be representative of the US population.
All of our data other than labor income span the years 1984 to 1993. The reason for this
is that the SRHS data are not available prior to 1984, whereas the unemployment data are not
publicly available past 1993. We employ labor income data from 1978 to 1993. The reason
8It is informative to contrast the impact of wages on health in our framework with what happens in Grossman’s
original model. In this setup, we allow the health production function to depend on the wage which suggests the
possibility of a direct causal eﬀect of wages on health. This is a departure from much of the health economics
literature. The reason is that while many non-economists have come to accept that income or social status
may directly cause health (see Marmot, et al. 1991, Marmot 2004 for example), economists have tended to be
less accepting of direct causation from income to health. (see Smith 1999 and Adams, Hurd, et al. 2003, for
example). In contrast, in Grossman’s original setup, in which medical care and time are inputs in the health
production function and in which sickness reduces a person’s ability to work, an increase in wages will raise the
value of productive time which will then create an incentive for people to further invest in their own health by
substituting away from the time input towards medical care. Consequently, while it is the case in Grossman’s
framework that richer people are also healthier people, it is only because higher wages increase incentives for
health investment. In contrast, in this setup, if higher wages lead to better health, it is only because we allow the
wage to directly impact the marginal productivity of health investment. Practically speaking, this distinction
is not important for our purposes. What is important is that there are pathways through which an increase in
the wage will either improve or deteriorate one’s health. Our choice of modeling the positive impact of wages on
health by allowing the wage to directly enter the health production function was only to simplify the model.
9for going back to 1978 with these data is that it allows us to have more instruments when we
employ a GMM procedure from Arellano and Bond (1991) later on in the paper. The addition
of more instruments enhances the eﬃciency of the procedure. Additional detail concerning this
is provided in Section 5.
The PSID contains a sample of economically disadvantaged people called the Survey of Eco-
nomic Opportunities (SEO). There is little consensus within the profession about how one should
deal with the SEO. Because it is selected on income and, thus, endogenous, conventional weight-
ing schemes will not work. Accordingly, some people such as Lillard and Willis (1977) simply
recommend dropping the SEO due to endogenous selection. Nevertheless, there are others such
as Hyslop (1999) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) who include the SEO. We follow these authors
and include the SEO as well. Our reason for its inclusion is that one of our primary outcomes
is mortality which happens relatively infrequently, especially for younger people. Consequently,
dropping the SEO from the sample would have resulted in too few deaths in our data.
Our mortality data come from the PSID’s death ﬁle which is considered sensitive data and,
thus, not publicly available. The death ﬁle contains mortality information on all individuals
in the PSID from 1968 to 2003 who were known to have died prior to 2003. There are a total
of 4705 recorded deaths in the ﬁle. Because it is essential for our purposes to control for the
individual’s morbidity and because SRHS is not available prior to 1984, we only use death dates
from 1984 to 2003. This reduces the number of deaths to 2849. Mortality information ﬁrst
comes from interviews with PSID families. PSID then corroborates this information with the
National Death Index. For some individuals, PSID could not precisely date the time of death.
We do not use these less precise dates. This further reduces the number of deaths in our data
10to 2797.9
We assume that all individuals who were not in the death ﬁle were alive as of 2003. We
concede that this is a strong assumption. However, there was an eﬀort on the part of PSID to
verify the deaths of people in families who have attrited from the panel. Nevertheless, there
may still be some people who have left the panel and, subsequently, died after the household was
being interviewed by PSID and, thus, are not in the death ﬁle. This would create a situation
in which dead people are mis-classiﬁed as alive. To address this issue, in addition to working
with the full sample, we also work with a restricted sample of people that includes only people
who were known to have died prior to 2003 and people who were present in the 2003 wave of
t h eP S I Da n d ,t h u s ,k n o w nt oh a v es u r v i v e dt ot h a ty e a r . O u rc o r er e s u l t sa r eu n a ﬀected by
restricting the sample in such a way. Because of this, we decided to work with the full sample
f o rm o s to fo u rr e s u l t sa st h i sg a v eu sm o r ei n f o r m a t i o na n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,h i g h e re ﬃciency.
Table 2 summarizes our mortality data. The ﬁrst column of the table reports the percentage
of people 30 years or older that have died before 2003 for each wave of our sample. For example,
the table shows that 22.83% of all people who were older than 30 in 1984 have died prior to
2003. The second column shows the average number of years that each individual has survived
subsequent to the survey year. Because PSID records both the year and month of death, survival
is measured to the nearest month. If the person had not died by 2003, we censor the observation
at 2004 minus the survey year. For example, the people from the 1984 wave who survived until
2003 have their observations censored at 20 years.
9It is important to highlight that while this may appear to be a large number of deaths, it actually can become
quite small once we start to look at sub-samples of the PSID which are broken down by gender and age. For
example, in the 1984 wave, there were 315 recorded deaths of men who were between the ages of 30 and 60 at the
time of the survey. However, if we were to have excluded the SEO, this number drops to 132 which highlights
the importance of including the SEO in our analysis.
11Figure 1 plots survivor functions from the PSID for men between the ages of 30 and 60, men
older than 60, women between ages 30 and 60 and women older than 60. Each panel of the
ﬁgure contains ten graphs which correspond to each of the ten years of our panel (i.e.1 9 8 4t o
1993). Each of these graphs takes all of the people in the sample of a certain age from a given
wave of the survey and plots the percentage of these people who survived to each subsequent
year through 2003. For example, the bottom graph in each panel corresponds to the base year
1984 and plots the percentage of people who survived until 1985, 1986, 1987, etc.10
The ﬁgures show that, while in a particular survey year death is a low probability event, over
the course of 20 years, it is quite common. For men and women, we see that 10% of the baseline
sample who was younger than 60 in 1984 died prior to 2003. For people who were older than
60 in 1984, the probabilities become 70% and 60% for men and women, respectively.
Our other measure of health is SRHS which is a categorical variable that takes on integer
values between one and ﬁve and measures the respondent’s assessment of their own health. A one
represents excellent health and a ﬁve represents poor health. If SRHS is two, three or four then
the respondents rate their health as very good, good or fair. These measures, while subjective,
do correlate extremely well with more objective measures of health. Numerous studies have
shown that SRHS is informative of speciﬁc morbidities and subsequent mortality (Mossey and
Shapiro 1982; Kaplan and Camacho 1983; Idler and Kasl 1995). In addition, Smith (2004)
has used retrospective health measures from the PSID and shown that there is a tendency for
people to downgrade their self-assessment of their own health when a new condition manifests.11
10 It is important to note that our data show the stylized fact that women have lower mortality, as shown in
Figure 1, and higher morbidity, as shown in Table 1. However, this does not suggest that the SRHS are of poor
quality. Rather, it merely reﬂects that women tend to suﬀer from a diﬀerent distribution of chronic ailments
than men (Case and Paxson, 2005).
11Since the retrospective health measures are only available after 1999 and because our sample only goes through
12Throughout this analysis, we map the SRHS measure into two dummy variables: good health,
w h i c hi st u r n e do nw h e nS R H Si se i t h e rao n eo rat w o ,a n db a dh e a l t h ,w h i c hi st u r n e do nw h e n
SRHS is either a four or a ﬁv e . T h eo m i t t e dS R H Sc a t e g o r yi sg o o dh e a l t hw h i c hi sc o d e da s
SRHS being equal to three.
Table 3 shows the results from estimation of Cox-Proportional hazard models to illustrate
the relationship between SRHS and mortality in the PSID.12 We estimate the models using
the 1984 wave of the PSID with the number of years that the individual survived subsequent to
1984 as the dependent variable. If the individual did not die prior to 2004, then the outcome is
censored at 20. As can be seen in the upper and bottom left panels, good health is associated
with a lower probability of death, whereas bad health is associated with a higher probability of
death for men and women between the ages of 30 and 60. It is important to note that the whole
range of the SRHS measure appears to be informative of mortality, although the bottom two
categories (i.e. bad health) seem to be the most informative. Turning to men and women older
than 60 in the right-hand panel, we see that SRHS remains important. However, now we see
that only good health is informative of male mortality, whereas bad health is only informative of
female mortality for this sample of older people. This table provides further evidence that the
SRHS variables in the PSID are very good measures of the respondent’s health.
A ﬁnal issue with our data that warrants some attention concerns the possibility of correlated
disturbances within counties. As has been pointed out by many, such as Moulton (1990),
in geographically stratiﬁed samples, estimation of standard errors can be problematic if there
1993, the retrospective health measures would not be well-suited for our purposes due to problems associated
with recall bias.
12For additional detail on this estimation procedure, see Section 4.1.
13are correlated disturbances within strata. Often times this critique is raised when aggregate
variables (like county-level unemployment rates) are combined with micro-units. Failure to
address this will tend to result in underestimated standard errors. However, because the PSID
is not geographically stratiﬁed by county, it is not clear that Moulton’s critique is relevant in
our case. Indeed, if the sample is independent within counties, there is no need to adjust the
standard errors at all. On the other hand, if there are correlated disturbances within counties,
it would be necessary to adjust the standard errors regardless of whether or not county-level
variables are being used. In other words, using a county-level variable with an individual unit
does not change the survey design. Nevertheless, there still may be some concern that there
are unobserved correlated factors within geographic units which aﬀect our standard errors. A
solution to this problem which is commonly employed in the profession is to cluster the standard
error by county, although the asymptotic justiﬁcation for such a procedure is not that clear in
non-linear models. Unfortunately, county of residence is considered sensitive by PSID and,
thus, is not publicly available. However, when using a single wave of the PSID, it is possible to
construct a variable that is unique for all counties in a given state with the same unemployment
rate. For example, if a person lives in a state which is coded as 12 and the unemployment
rate in their county is 6, then we code this variable as 1206. It is important to state that this
procedure is apt to be too conservative since it clusters on all counties in a given state with the
same unemployment rate. Because unemployment rates change across time, we are unable to
use this procedure when multiple waves of the sample are used. In practice, what we ﬁnd is
that our conclusions are unaﬀected by whether or not we use the clustering procedure.
144 Aggregate Economic Conditions and Health
We now turn to the task of investigating the relationship between aggregate economic shocks
and health outcomes. In Section 4.1, we present cross-sectional evidence. In Section 4.2, we
discuss the impact of mis-classiﬁed mortality on our cross-sectional estimates. In Section 4.3,
we present panel evidence.
4.1 Cross-Sectional Estimates
We begin this section by estimating hazard models to investigate the relationship between unem-
ployment and mortality in the 1984 wave of the PSID. We use the 1984 wave because using the
earliest wave of the PSID that is available provides the highest variation in subsequent survival.
In Section 4.3, we conduct an analysis that combines all ten waves.13 We let T denote the
number of years (measured to the nearest month) that an individual has survived subsequent to
1984. Because we only have mortality information through 2003, T is censored at 20 years.
We specify a proportional hazard function of the form
λi(t|xi)=e x p ( xiβ)λ(t) (7)
where λ(t) denotes the baseline hazard. xi contains age, race, education, bad health (i.e. SRHS
is either fair or poor), good health (i.e. SRHS is either excellent or good), state dummies and
13Estimating a hazard model with all ten waves of the panel would require the use of duration models with
time varying regressors. These techniques raise many subtle issues which according to Lancaster (1990) have not
been “fully clariﬁed” in the literature. Consequently, we estimate duration models on single waves of the panel
and reserve the full use of the panel for later when we use more transparent techniques that will yield results that
are easier to interpret.
15the county unemployment rate. The hazard function gives us the instantaneous probability of
dying conditional on having survived t years.14 We use the Cox Partial Likelihood Estimator
to estimate β. This procedure does not require a speciﬁcation for the baseline hazard. For
more information on this estimation procedure, we refer the reader to Chapter 11 of Amemiya
(1985). In practice, we experimented with other parametric hazard functions such as a Weibull,
Exponential and Log-Normal speciﬁcations. Our conclusions were unaﬀected.
At this point in the paper, we do not concern ourselves with addressing unobserved het-
erogeneity. Typically, in duration models, addressing unobserved heterogeneity is more of an
issue when attempting to identify duration dependence. As pointed out by Wooldridge (2002),
the case for the explicit modeling of unobserved heterogeneity is “less compelling” when the
researcher is interested in estimating the impact of a covariate of interest on mean duration.
Nevertheless, there still may be some concern that there are unobserved individual characteris-
tics which are correlated with mortality but diﬀer systematically across areas with high and low
unemployment. For example, if it is the case that healthier people are better able to move out
of depressed areas to ﬁnd work than unhealthy people, one would expect to see a correlation
between high unemployment rates and poorer health outcomes. This mechanism suggests that
any positive correlation between unemployment and bad health would at least partly reﬂect se-
lection. However, it is our opinion that it is inappropriate to address this correlation with single
spell duration data since identiﬁcation would hinge upon a parametric assumption on the rela-
tionship between unobservables and the exogenous covariates.15 Consequently, we address these
14Formally, we have that
λi(t|xi)=l i m
h↓0
P(t ≤ T<t+ h|T ≥ t,xi,t)
h
.
15Existing non-parametric methods for dealing with unobserved heterogeneity in duration models such as Heck-
16selection concerns later on in the paper when we employ some ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation procedures
in Section 4.3 and Section 5. These procedures have the advantage that they impose less strin-
gent assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity which, in turn, results in more transparent
identiﬁcation.
In Table 4, we report estimates of hazard models using a sample of men and women between
the ages of 30 and 60. Each cell reports the hazard ratio associated with raising a given covariate
by one unit and the t-statistic corresponding to the underlying coeﬃcient. If the hazard ratio
is above unity, then the variable has a positive eﬀect on mortality. It it is less than unity, then
it has a negative eﬀect. For men, we see that higher unemployment is associated with higher
mortality in all ﬁve columns. Typically, the eﬀect of unemployment on mortality is at least 50%
the eﬀect of age. However, when we look at working-aged women in the bottom panel, we see
that the relationship between unemployment and mortality is ﬂat in the ﬁrst four columns and
is moderately signiﬁcant and negative in column 5.
The positive relationship between unemployment and mortality that we uncover for working-
aged men most likely reﬂects two components: a selection component and a causal component.
The selection component could result from unhealthy people tending to live in depressed areas,
whereas the causal component may result from shocks to the economy adversely impacting
people’s health. However, the fact that positive eﬀect of the unemployment rate is robust to
the inclusion of controls for baseline health status, at least, partially mitigates the concern that
these results are entirely being driven by the selection component.
In Table 5, we estimate probits using the same sample that was used to generate the results in
man and Singer (1984) typically assume independence between the unobserved heterogeneity and the exogenous
covariates.
17Table 4 where the dependent variable is an indicator for having died at any point between 1984
and 2003. The table reports the marginal eﬀects. The results reinforce the results from the
hazard models. We see that an increase of 1% in unemployment raises the probability of dying
within twenty years by 0.004 points. It is interesting to contrast this with Table II from Ruhm
( 2 0 0 0 )w h e r eh es h o w e dt h a ta1 %i n c r e a s ei nt h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t elowers the probability of
dying in that year by at least 0.004 points. Thus, our estimated correlation between recessions
and health for working-aged men is of a much smaller magnitude and of the opposite sign than
Ruhm’s estimates.
Table 6 estimates hazard models for men and women 60 years of older. Now we see a smaller
eﬀect of recessions on health for men. The hazard ratios are a little more than half of what
they were in Table 4. Once again, we do not see much evidence of any relationship between
recessions and health for women.
4.2 Mis-Classiﬁed Mortality
Table 7 reports estimates of the Cox-Proportional Hazard model for a restricted sample of the
data which only includes people whose deaths were recorded in the death ﬁle or people who
were present in the panel in 2003 and, thus, known with absolute certainty to have survived to
that year. We estimate the models for working-aged men and women. Accordingly, Table 7 is
comparable to Table 4. Restricting the sample in this way excludes any people who are actually
dead but not present in the death ﬁle from the sample. In many respects, this procedure is
akin to chemotherapy in the sense that, while it does purge the data of mortality data that is
mis-classiﬁed (i.e. dead people who are coded as alive in our sample), it also purges the data of
18far more mortality data that is correctly classiﬁed. In this sense, this is somewhat of a draconian
solution to the problem of mis-classiﬁcation.
Comparing the results in Tables 7 and 4, we see few diﬀerences. In fact, for men, the hazard
ratios for the unemployment rate are virtually identical in both tables. The only diﬀerence
is that the standard errors on the unemployment estimates are higher in Table 7, which is not
surprising given that the sample in that table is 40% smaller. Turning to women, we see that the
hazard ratios for the unemployment rate are all systematically less than unity and are all lower
than they are in Table 4. However, unemployment is only signiﬁcant in column 5. Overall, the
similarities in Tables 4 and 7 suggest that possible mis-classiﬁed mortality data is not aﬀecting
our estimates in any meaningful way.
In Table 8, we estimate probits using a sample of working age men and women from the 1984
wave where the dependent variable is a selection indicator which was turned on if the person
was present in the restricted sample in Table 7. What we see is that, for both men and women,
in all ﬁve speciﬁcations that we considered, unemployment is never signiﬁcant. This suggests
that there is no systematic relationship between observations for which mortality may be mis-
classiﬁed and the unemployment rate. This further mitigates any concerns that the results in
Tables 4, 5 and 6 may be adversely impacted by a failure of PSID to document the deaths of
every person who attrites.
4.3 Panel Estimates

















i,t are indicators for dying within one, three and ﬁve years of the survey
year. We estimate the parameters of the model using a random eﬀects probit estimator. These
models have the advantage that they make eﬃcient use of all ten waves of our PSID sample and
avoid the complications of duration models with time-varying regressors.
Tables 9 and 10 report the random eﬀects estimates of equation 8 for men and women
respectively. The top panels corresponds to people between the ages of 30 and 60 and the
bottom panels corresponds to people who are older than 60. In Table 9, two points are worth
noting. First, the unemployment rate is only a positive and signiﬁcant correlate of mortality
when the outcome is dying within one year of the survey year. This is true of both working-
aged and older men. Second, we see that the point-estimate of the unemployment coeﬃcient in
column 1 is 0.038 for working-aged men and 0.029 for older men so that the relationship between
unemployment and mortality is much stronger for working-aged men than for older men. Turning
to Table 10, we see no signiﬁcant relationship between unemployment and mortality for women.
Thus, both tables reinforce the conclusion of Section 4.1 that a positive relationship between
recessions and mortality is only present for men and is strongest in the population of working-
aged men. In column 3 of the table, there is some weak evidence of a negative relationship
between recessions and mortality for women, but the coeﬃcient is only moderately signiﬁcant
with a t-statistc of -1.41.
20Next, we consider models of the form:
h
j






i,t ≥ 0) for j = B,G (9)
where hB
i,t is an indicator for bad health (SRHS greater than or equal to four) and hG
i,t is an indica-
tor for good health (SRHS less than or equal to two). We estimate the parameters in equation 9
using the conditional logit model. This procedure maximizes the likelihood function conditional
on the sum of h
j




i,t has a logistic distribution and the
covariates are strictly exogenous. Consequently, this conditioning procedure purges the model
of the ﬁxed-eﬀect, α
j
i. Its advantage is that it does not require any distributional assumptions
on the ﬁxed-eﬀect and, thus, allows for arbitrary correlation between α
j
i and xi,t.16 This oﬀers
a semi-parametric way of addressing concerns that the previous results in this paper were the
consequence of selection resulting from depressed areas being inhabited by less healthy people
rather than the direct causal eﬀect of recessions on health. Of course, as is always the case, the
beneﬁts of relaxing distributional assumptions come at the expense of reduced eﬃciency.
The conditional logit results are presented in Table 11. We present estimates for four
groups: working-aged men and women and older men and women. Because the conditioning
procedure purges the model of all time invariant variables, the need for a rich set of covariates
is obviated. Accordingly, we only include age and the unemployment rate as control variables.
When bad health is the dependent variable, there is no relationship between recessions and
health. Presumably, however, this has a lot to do with the infrequency with which the bottom
16For a textbook treatment of the conditional logit model, we refer the reader to pp. 839 - 840 of Greene (2000).
21two SRHS categories occur in the sub-sample of working-aged people. Indeed, this can be seen in
the “eﬀective” sample sizes in the table.17 When good health is the outcome, the eﬀective sample
sizes are 2826 and 3076 for men and women, respectively, and when bad health is the outcome
the eﬀective sample sizes drop to 1307 and 1714, respectively. However, for working-aged men,
when good health is the dependent variable, we see that increases in the unemployment rate are
associated decreases in health status, but for the remaining three sub-groups in the table, there
is no relationship between recessions and health.
5 Idiosyncratic Economic Conditions and Health
We begin this section by considering the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and an
individual’s economic circumstances. To illustrate this relationship, we estimate linear ﬁxed-
eﬀects regressions where the dependent variable is either (log) labor income or an indicator for
having positive labor income which we sometimes call labor supply for lack of a better name. The
independent variables are the unemployment rate and a quadratic in age. These regressions give
us some notion of how variation in macroeconomic conditions across time for a given individual
translates into an individual-speciﬁc earnings shock. The results are reported in Table 12. In
the table, we do not see any substantial eﬀects of unemployment ﬂuctuations on labor supply,
but we do see large eﬀects on labor income. The estimates indicate that a 1 point increase in the
unemployment rate translates into a reduction of earnings of approximately 3% on average. We
now focus our attention to the task of identifying the impact of these individual-speciﬁce a r n i n g s
17The condition logit model only uses observations where the dependent variable switches states. In our case,
this means people have at least one transition into or out of a health state. The “eﬀective” sample size refers to
the number of people in the sample who have at least one transition into or out of a state.
22shocks on health outcomes.
To do this, we work with the dynamic model:
h
B




i,tλ + ai,tδ + υi,t. (10)
hB
i,t is an indicator for bad health (i.e. SRHS is either fair or poor).y i,t is a vector which includes
income and labor supply (an indicator for having zero labor income). ai,t is age. We assume that
the residual is mean zero and serially uncorrelated so that E[υi,t]=E[υi,tυi,s]=0for s 6= t.18









i,tδ + ∆υi,t (11)
Equations (10) and (11) account for two important aspects of the theory of health invest-
ment. First, because equation (11) is purged of the ﬁxed-eﬀect, it allows for all time-invariant
individual characteristics to be correlated with both health and earnings. This is important
since heterogeneity in preferences, discount factors and budget constraints will generate a spu-
rious correlation between earnings and health and, thus, it is essential that the model is purged
of these unobserved individual characteristics. Second, because we control for an individual’s
health yesterday, we rule out any omitted variable biases that would result from a person’s health
yesterday feeding-back and impacting labor supply today. This is particularly important in light
of Grossman’s original formulation of health investment in which sickness reduces a person’s stock
of “healthy time” which, in turn, constrains their ability to earn. In fact, the estimation proce-
18We will provide tests of the plausibility of the lack of serial correlation in υi,t later in the paper.
23dure that we employ, which is discussed in the next sub-section, can be generalized to allow for,
not only health yesterday, but also health today, to impact today’s earnings.
5.1 Identiﬁcation and Estimation
Identiﬁcation of the parameters in equations (10) and (11) comes from two sets of moment











where E∗[y|x] denotes the linear-projection of y onto x. We call this Assumption P because these
moment conditions suppose that income and labor supply are predetermined variables. This
condition assumes that health shocks today are uncorrelated with the history of health outcomes
through yesterday and labor market outcomes through today. However, it allows for feedback
in the sense that health today can impact labor market outcomes tomorrow. The weaker set of






i ]=0 . (E)
We call this Assumption E because, in contrast to Assumption P, it allows for a contemporaneous
relationship between health and labor supply and, thus, treats income as an endogenous variable.
Assumption E has the advantage that it imposes weaker assumptions on the data, but comes at
24the expense of reduced eﬃciency.19
To estimate the model, we use the GMM estimator outlined in Arellano and Bond (1991).
Arellano and Bond (AB) applies Assumptions P and E to the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model in equation



















i as instruments for ∆yi,t and ∆hi,t−1. Analogously, equation 13, which




i as instruments for ∆yi,t and ∆hi,t−1. We follow
the recommendations of AB and report the parameter estimates from the one-step procedure.
As we discussed in the data section, the SRHS data is not available prior 1984 and, consequently,
we can only use health as an instrument through that year. However, because data on labor
i n c o m ea r ea v a i l a b l ef o rt h ee n t i r ed u r a t i o no ft h eP S I D ,w ee m p l o yd a t ao ni n c o m et h r o u g h
1978. We did not use data prior to 1978 because we did not expect income from 1977 or earlier
to have much explanatory power for the ﬁrst-diﬀerence in health from 1986 or later.
We investigated the possibility that these instruments are weak. Recent research has shown
that when instrumental variables do not have suﬃcient explanatory power in the ﬁrst-stage
regressions, the ﬁnite sample distribution of the estimator can diﬀer substantially from its as-
ymptotic distribution (see Staiger and Stock (1994) and Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995), for
19For an excellent discussion of using these types of moment restrictions to identify dynamic linear panel data
models, see Arellano and Honoré (2001).
25example). To look into this issue, we regressed ∆hi,t a n de a c he l e m e n to f∆yi,t on the vector,
(hi,t−2,...,hi,t−4,y0
i,t−2,...,y0
i,t−4).T h e F-tests of joint signiﬁcance of the regressors all had ex-
tremely low p-values and, thus, there was no indication that weak instruments was a problem.
T h er e s u l t sa r en o tr e p o r t e d ,b u ta r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
5.2 Speciﬁcation Tests
One of the primary advantages of the AB procedure is that the model’s assumptions yield many
moment restrictions which can be used to construct speciﬁcation tests which shed light on the
plausibility of the identifying assumptions of the model. AB propose two speciﬁcation tests.
The ﬁrst test centers on the fact that when υi,t exhibits no serial correlation, we will have
that E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−1] 6=0(provided that the process for υi,t d o e sn o th a v eau n i tr o o t )a n d
E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−2]=0 . This speciﬁcation test calculates the sample analogues of E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−1]
and E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−2] to construct statistics that converge to a standard normal distribution. We
follow the notation in AB and let m1 denote the statistic that is based on E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−1] and let
m2 denote the statistic that is based on E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−2].20 Calculation of m1 is very important
because if υi,t follows a random walk then we will have that E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−1]=E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−2]=
0. Consequently, it is possible for m2 to be small even if υi,t exhibits a large degree of persistence.
So, if the model is correctly speciﬁed and there is no serial correlation in υi,t then m1 should be
big and m2 should be small. Further detail on the calculation of m1 and m2 can be found in
AB (pp. 281 - 282).
The second speciﬁcation test that we work with is the Sargan test of over-identifying restric-
20In fact, AB can accommodate serial correlation in υi,t of the form MA(q) via weaker moment conditions.
However, as it turns out, our calculations of m2 suggests that such accommodation is not necessary.
26tions (Sargan 1958; Hansen 1982). We use the two-step Sargan Statistic which is robust to
heteroskedasticity.21 We chose the two-step statistic over the one-step statistic because Monte
Carlo experiments in AB suggest that there is a tendency for the non-robust test to over-reject
and, thus, AB recommend placing more weight on the two-step statistic. The statistic is asymp-
totically chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions
in the model.
5.3 Results
Tables 13 and 14 report the AB estimates for working-aged men and women, respectively. The
top panel uses Assumption P and the bottom panel uses Assumption E. The ﬁrst three columns
use bad health as the dependent variable. The last column uses the ﬁve point categorical SRHS
variable as the dependent variable. We concede that the linear model that we estimate does
not allow for the ordinal nature of the ﬁve-point SRHS variable. However, the ﬁve-point SRHS
variable has the advantage that it has more variation in the time-series than bad health which
only changes when people move in or out of the bottom two SRHS categories. This increased
variation in the time-series is extremely useful with ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation.
Table 13 provides evidence of a causal eﬀe c to fi n c o m es h o c k so nh e a l t ho u t c o m e sf o rw o r k i n g -
aged men. In the top panel, income and labor supply are signiﬁcant in columns 1, 2, and 4.
In the bottom panel, the only signiﬁcant variable is labor supply in column 4. However, it is
immensely important to emphasize that the point-estimates in columns 1, 2 and 4 in the bottom
panel are always at least as large in magnitude as they are in the top panel. What this suggests is
21Unlike the Sargan Statistics, the speciﬁcation test that uses m1 and m2 is deﬁned in terms of any consistent
estimator. In other words, the statistics m1 and m2 do not necessarily require the eﬃcient two-step estimator.
27that the low t-statistics in the bottom panel of the table are most likely the result of ineﬃciencies
associated with the weaker set of moment conditions which come from Assumption E. Finally, in
column 1 of both panels, we see that the coeﬃcient on income is roughly equal and opposite the
coeﬃcient on age suggesting that the impact of an earnings shock on health is of a meaningful
magnitude.
The speciﬁcation tests in the bottom of both panels suggest that our moment restrictions
hold up reasonably well in the data. Looking at the calculations of m2,w ec a n n o tr e j e c tt h e
null that E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−2]=0at the 5% level in all eight speciﬁcations. The p-values on m1 are
all extremely low and, thus, always reject the null that E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−1]=0 . This rules out a
unit root in the process for υi,t. The two-step Sargan Statistic, which AB recommend, is not
signiﬁcant at the 5% in columns 2 and 3 of both panels and is not signiﬁcant at the 10% level
in column 2 of both panels. It only has an extremely low p-value in the fourth column of both
panels. However, this is not shocking since the linear model is probably not the best way to
deal with the ﬁve-point SRHS variable.
Table 14, which reports the results for working-aged women, is a stark contrast to Table 13.
Most of the speciﬁcations suggest that there is no relationship running from income shocks to
health outcomes. However, in column 4 of the top panel, there is some weak evidence that an
exogenous reduction in labor supply is associated with worse health. The estimates in column
3 of the bottom panel are the only estimates that are signiﬁcant at conventional levels and are
somewhat diﬃcult to interpret. The coeﬃcient on labor supply suggests that a negative shock to
labor supply is bad for health, whereas the coeﬃcient on income suggests that a negative income
shock is good for health. The speciﬁcation tests in the table perform reasonably well. Overall,
28t h et a b l ed o e sn o tp r o v i d estrong evidence of any eﬀect of income shocks on health outcomes for
working-aged women.
Finally, we investigate at which part of the income distribution the impact of income shocks
on health is greatest. To do this, we construct dummies for being below the 25th and 75th
percentiles of the income distribution. We estimate equation (11) under the assumption that
these income variables are predetermined using the sub-sample of working-aged men and women.
The quartiles that were used to construct the dummies were calculated separately for men and
women.
The results are reported in Table 15. The speciﬁcations assume that income is predetermined.
The ﬁrst three columns correspond to men and the last two correspond to women. Columns 1
and 4 only include a dummy variable for having zero labor income and are, thus, identical to
column 2 in the upper panel of Tables 13 and 14. Because approximately 25% of working-aged
women in our data reported zero labor income, we do not include the 25th percentile dummy
for women. In columns 1 and 4, we see that a shock to labor supply has a signiﬁcant adverse
impact on men’s health and no impact on women’s health. In columns 2 and 3, we include the
25th and 75th percentile dummies, respectively. We see that transitions into and out of these
parts of the income distribution have no impact on men’s health. The 75th percentile dummy
is also insigniﬁcant for women. We conclude that, to the extent that this sections suggests that
there is a causal impact of income shocks on men’s health, the eﬀects tend to be concentrated
in the bottom part of the income distribution.
296C o n c l u s i o n s a n d C a v e a t s
In this paper, we documented a strong correlation between economic shocks and health for
working-aged men. For this sub-population, we showed that county-speciﬁc macroeconomic
conditions are strong predictors of mortality. This correlation persists even after controls for
baseline morbidity are included in the regressions which partially mitigates concerns that the
result is driven by the selection of less healthy people into depressed counties. In addition,
we utilized a methodology from the literature on dynamic panel data models which allowed for
the impact of health on labor supply and provided evidence that idiosyncratic shocks to income
cause a deterioration in health status for those who resided in the lowest part of the income
distribution. This provided an additional piece of evidence that part of the correlation between
health and aggregate shocks that we observed for working-aged men is driven by an underlying
causal relationship at least at the bottom part of the income distribution.
It is important to place these ﬁndings within the context of some of the literature which has
investigated causal pathways between SES and health. One of the most important papers on
this topic is Adams, Hurd, at al. (2003) who investigate causality between wealth and health in
a population of older Americans. They ﬁnd no evidence of a causal link from SES to mortality
and many morbidities, but they do reject the hypothesis of non-causality for some primary causes
of death of older men such as cancer and heart disease.22 In a related piece, Meer, Miller and
Rosen (2003) use inheritance as an instrument for changes in wealth and ﬁnd no evidence that
health improves with exogenous increases in wealth.
22For an interesting comment on this paper, see Adda, Chandola and Marmot (2003).
30While it may be tempting to say that our research is at loggerheads with this earlier work,
we do not believe that this is the case. It is true that we do provide some evidence that income
shocks may have sizable impacts on the health of working-aged men at the bottom of the income
distribution. However, this is, by no means, in contradiction with the assertion that exogenous
changes in wealth (not income) do not inﬂuence health in a population of older people.
It is also important to place this work within the context of the literature on recessions and
health. First, we provide no solid evidence that health improves when economic circumstances
deteriorate. Second, we provide ample evidence that poor aggregate and individual economic
conditions are correlated with poor health. Third, we provide evidence that part of this corre-
lation is causal.
Finally, some caveats on the limitations of this work deserve to be mentioned. First, it is not
clear to what extent our estimates of the impact of labor income on self-reported health status
t r a n s l a t ei n t oa ni m p a c to nm o r t a l i t y . G i v e nt h er e s u l t so fS e c t i o n4 ,w eb e l i e v et h a tt h e r em a y
be some eﬀect on mortality, but the magnitude of this eﬀect is hard to infer from this analysis.
For this reason, these results should not be used to conclude that Brenner’s results were correct.
Second, due to the constraints of the PSID, the health measures that we employ are somewhat
limited. However, one of the primary advantages of the SRHS measures that we employ is that
they exhibit signiﬁcant variation across time which enables the use of panel data methods such
as the AB estimator. Without substantial time variation, as would be the case with measures
of speciﬁc conditions such as diabetes and heart disease, these methods cannot be used.
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∗All summary statistics correspond to the years 1984 - 1993 except for labor income and supply.
∗∗Summary statistics are for people older than 30.
1These summary statistics correspond to 1978 - 1993.
2Labor Income is in 1982 dollars.
38Table 2: Mortality in the PSID











∗All statistics correspond to people older than 30.
1Each number is the percentage of people who are at least 30 in a given year
who die before 2003.
2Average survival is the average number of years subesquent to the survey
year that the individual has survived.
Table 3: SRHS and Mortality in the PSID





































∗This table contains results from the Cox-Proportional Hazard model.
∗∗Each cell reports the hazard ratio for an incremental change in a given variable.
∗∗∗t-ratios correspond to the unreported coeﬃcients for each variable.
∗∗∗∗All standard errors account for using county-level variables.
39Table 4: Hazard Models- 1984 Base Year - Between 30 and 60































































State Dummies No No No No Yes
Likelihood -2186.58 -2172.70 -2152.33 -2152.28 -2119.74































































State Dummies No No No No Yes
Likelihood -1904.81 -1904.08 -1891.65 -1891.20 -1870.55
N 2875 2871 2871 2871 2871
∗This table contains results from the Cox-Proportional Hazard model.
∗∗Each cell reports the hazard ratio for an incremental change in a given variable.
∗∗∗t-ratios correspond to the unreported coeﬃcients for each variable.
∗∗∗∗All standard errors account for using county-level variables.
40Table 5: Probits- 1984 Base Year - Between 30 and 60































































State Dummies No No No No Yes
Pseudo - R2 0.1117 0.1186 0.1394 0.1397 0.1591































































State Dummies No No No No Yes
Pseudo - R2 0.1315 0.1319 0.1468 0.1468 0.1679
N 2890 2886 2886 2886 2856
∗This table contains results from probits where the dependent variable is
an indicator for dying between 1984 and 2003.
∗∗Each cell reports marginal eﬀects.
∗∗∗t-ratios correspond to the unreported coeﬃcients for each variable.
∗∗∗∗All standard errors account for using county-level variables.
41Table 6: Hazard Models- 1984 Base Year - 60 Years or Older































































State Dummies No No No No Yes
Likelihood -2683.88 -2683.13 -2668.75 -2664.63 -2650.08































































State Dummies No No No No Yes
Likelihood -3641.26 -3631.35 -3615.34 -3613.29 -3590.08
N 981 979 979 979 979
∗This table contains results from the Cox-Proportional Hazard model.
∗∗Each cell reports the hazard ratio for an incremental change in a given variable.
∗∗∗t-ratios correspond to the unreported coeﬃcients for each variable.
∗∗∗∗All standard errors account for using county-level variables.
42Table 7: Hazard Models- 1984 Base Year - Between 30 and 60 - Restricted Sample































































State Dummies No No No No Yes
Likelihood -2022.61 -2004.19 -1979.72 -1979.71 -1945.70































































State Dummies No No No No Yes
Likelihood -1763.83 -1761.09 -1747.23 -1746.57 -1722.96
N 1723 1719 1719 1719 1719
∗This table contains results from the Cox-Proportional Hazard model.
∗∗Each cell reports the hazard ratio for an incremental change in a given variable.
∗∗∗t-ratios correspond to the unreported coeﬃcients for each variable.
∗∗∗∗All standard errors account for using county-level variables.
43Table 8: Selection Probits - Between 30 and 60































































State Dummies No No No No Yes
PseudoR2 0.0204 0.0287 0.0293 0.0300 0.0615































































State Dummies No No No No Yes
PseudoR2 0.0202 0.0271 0.0283 0.0287 0.0564
N 2890 2886 2886 2886 2880
∗This table contains results from probits where the dependent variable is the
selection indicator described in Section 4.2.
∗∗t-ratios are reported below each coeﬃcient.
∗∗∗All standard errors account for using county-level variables.
44Table 9: Random Eﬀects Estimates - Male Mortality
(1) (2) (3)
Between 30 and 60











































Likelihood -1292.52 -1246.78 -1192.84
N 6315 6315 6315
Older Than 60











































Likelihood -1831.30 -2225.95 -2202.63
N 1656 1656 1656
∗This table contains results from random eﬀects probits where
the dependent variables are indicators for dying between the
survey year and one, three and ﬁve years after.
∗∗Each cell reports marginal eﬀects.
∗∗∗t-ratios correspond to the unreported coeﬃcients for each variable.
45Table 10: Random Eﬀects Estimates - Female Mortality
(1) (2) (3)
Between 30 and 60











































Likelihood -728.63 -922.62 -961.10
N 6923 6923 6923
Older Than 60











































Likelihood -1930.79 -2378.60 -2430.73
N 2194 2194 2194
∗This table contains results from random eﬀects probits where
the dependent variables are indicators for dying between the
survey year and one, three and ﬁve years after.
∗∗Each cell reports marginal eﬀects.
∗∗∗t-ratios correspond to the unreported coeﬃcients for each variable.
46Table 11: Fixed Eﬀects Estimates - SRHS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men
Older Than 60 Between 30 and 60



















Likelihood -1790.36 -1700.52 -7253.74 -3119.23
N+ 682 652 2826 1304
Women
Older Than 60 Between 30 and 60



















Likelihood -2232.85 -2286.71 -8094.96 -4168.36
N+ 835 851 3076 1714
∗This table contains results from ﬁxed-eﬀects probits where the dependent
variable is an indicator for good or bad health.
∗∗t-ratios correspond to the unreported coeﬃcients for each variable.
+N corresponds to the "eﬀective" sample size i.e. the total number of people who
change health states while in the sample.
Table 12: Macroeconomic Shocks and Labor Market Outcomes
Labor Income Labor Supply












∗This table reports the coeﬃcient on unemployment from
ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions where the dependent variables
are labor income and labor supply. All regressions contain a
polynomial in age. The regressions where estimated using
people between the ages of 30 and 60.
∗∗t-statistics in parentheses.
∗∗∗Each cell reports the eﬀects of a 1% increase
in unemployment on labor income and labor force participation.
47Table 13: Arellano-Bond Estimates - Men Between Ages 30 and 60
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predetermined Variables























































































































O.I. Restrictions 118 118 201 118
N 5336 5336 5336 5336
∗t-statistics reported below each coeﬃcient estimate.
1Zero Labor Income? is an indicator which is turned on if labor income is zero.
2p-values in parentheses.
48Table 14: Arellano-Bond Estimates - Women Between Ages 30 and 60
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predetermined Variables























































































































O.I. Restrictions 118 118 201 118
N 5776 5776 5776 5776
∗t-statistics reported below each coeﬃcient estimate.
1Zero Labor Income? is an indicator which is turned on if labor income is zero.
2p-values in parentheses.
49Table 15: Arellano-Bond Estimates - Income by Quartile, People Between 30 and 60




























Income 25 Percentile -
0.004
(0.38) - --







































O.I. Restrictions 126 126 126 126 126
N 5336 5336 5336 5776 5776
∗This table assumes that all income and labor supply variables are predetermined.
∗∗t-statistics reported below each coeﬃcient estimate.
1Zero Labor Income? is an indicator which is turned on if labor income is zero.
2p-values in parentheses.
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Survivor Functions - Women Older Than 60
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